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If the First Amendment is to have any vitality, it ought
not be construed to cover only the extreme and




"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .
It is, at least at this juncture, a well settled principle of Free
Exercise jurisprudence that, while the freedom of religious belief
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am very grateful to the members of the Roger Williams University Law Re-
view Editorial Board, especially Todd Barton, Kathryn Windsor and Cameron
Jones, for their accomplished editorial insight and laudable respect for artis-
tic autonomy.
1. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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is absolute, the freedom to follow the dictates of conscience into
the realm of conduct may be sharply circumscribed. 3 The origins of
this idea date back to Reynolds v. United States,4 in which the
Court afforded no constitutional protection for religiously inspired
action in contravention of duly enacted polygamy laws. 5 To permit
judicial meddling with the governmental power to shape and order
human behavior, the Reynolds Court reasoned, would "make the
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the
land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself."6 Sherbert v. Verner7 and its progeny8 theoretically un-
dermined the Reynolds philosophy by erecting a strict scrutiny re-
gime for religious conduct incidentally burdened by regulations of
general applicability. 9 However, the stark pattern of unsuccessful
free exercise claims advanced outside the narrow unemployment
compensation context is a testament to the Court's undeniably di-
luted application of heightened scrutiny and its duplicitous adher-
3. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 879. The Smith Court stated:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or
restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a
political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge
of political responsibilities.
Id. (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-
595 (1940)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ("[Tlhe Court has
rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regula-
tion of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles.. .. ");
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1960) ("[Tlhe freedom to act, even
when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally free
from legislative restrictions."); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878) ("Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but
was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or sub-
versive or good order.").
4. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
5. Id. at 165-66.
6. Id. at 167.
7. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
8. E.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
9. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 406-07 (demanding a showing of a "compelling
state interest" and a lack of "alternative forms of regulation" in order to jus-
tify "substantial infringement of religious liberties").
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ence to the belief/conduct distinction of Reynolds.10
Employment Division v. Smith,11 therefore, is probably rightly
regarded as merely a formal recognition of the Court's time-
honored abhorrence of constitutionally protected "lawlessness" - of
the religious citizen becoming, in a sense, her own lawgiver due to
some religious tenet or sacramental rite. To assuage this fear, the
Court in Smith explicitly abandoned the strict scrutiny test, opt-
ing instead for a rational basis test for all facially neutral and
generally applicable laws.' 2 In the immediate post-Smith era,
there was much lamentation over the draconian implications of a
rule relegating the Free Exercise Clause to the function of policing
only those laws rife with religious animus.13 But now that the tide
of criticism against Smith has subsided somewhat, many commen-
tators have directed their attention to the protective nuances of
Smith, particularly the nondiscrimination idea implicit in the neu-
trality and general applicability requirements. 4 Smith has been
characterized largely as safeguarding a right against disparate
treatment: when lawmakers decide to carve out secular exceptions
in order to alleviate a secular burden of some sort, Smith may
provide a window or trigger to strict scrutiny for claimants seek-
ing a corresponding religious exception.' 5 Accordingly, Smith en-
forces a basic rule couched in the idiom of equal protection: The
10. Of the plethora of free exercise claims brought, the Court has recog-
nized only one. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (1972) (invalidating compulsory
school-attendance policy as applied to Amish parents objecting on religious
grounds to send their children to school).
11. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
12. Id. at 878-79. The Court explained:
We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate .... Subsequent
decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise
does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).'
Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
13. Infra Part II.
14. Infra Part I.
15. See Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The Gen-
eral Applicability Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POLY 627, 638 (2003).
2004]
76 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.10:73
law must treat similar religious and secular conduct equally in or-
der to pass constitutional muster.
Smith left some major questions unanswered as to the mean-
ing and scope of the neutrality and general applicability require-
ments, and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,16
handed down three years after Smith, offered little in the way of
elucidation. Lukumi stands for the general proposition that a law
burdening only religious conduct is neither neutral nor of general
application. 17 However, Lukumi merely reaffirmed the intuitively
obvious: that specifically applicable laws are not generally appli-
cable. The Court in Smith essentially said as much when it opined
that a prohibition on "bowing down before a golden calf' would
"doubtless be unconstitutional."8 The more fruitful inquiry, how-
ever, is whether a law applicable to a broad class of secular and
religious entities with only a single exemption for a particular
form of non-religious conduct would violate the rule of Smith. Un-
til the Court confronts a more difficult fact-pattern than that pre-
sented in Lukumi - one involving a generally, though not
universally, applicable law - the precise contours of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause will likely remain indiscernible.
Certain state mandatory reporting laws on child abuse and
neglect provide a useful backdrop against which one might explore
the reach of the Smith/Lukumi regime. 19 These laws are varie-
gated as to who must report, what information must be reported,
and in what manner the reports must be made. All fifty states
currently have clergy-communicant privilege statutes that have
been (1) completely preserved, (2) partially suspended or (3)
wholly suspended for purposes of either (a) the reporting duty or
(b) the admissibility of evidence in proceedings initiated pursuant
to their respective reporting laws, or (c) both the reporting duty
and the admissibility of evidence.20 A majority of jurisdictions,
16. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
17. See id. at 543 ("The principle that government, in pursuit of legiti-
mate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct
motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guar-
anteed by the Free Exercise Clause.") (emphasis added).
18. 494 U.S. at 877-78.
19. For a brief discussion on this topic, see Andrew Beerworth, Religion
in the Marketplace: Establishments, Pluralisms, and the Doctrinal Eclipse of
Free Exercise, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 333, 380, 383 (2004).
20. Infra Part IV.
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particularly in the wake of the Catholic Church abuse scandal,
have imposed a reporting duty on clergy members in addition to a
litany of secular agents, such as social workers, physicians, psy-
chiatrists, firefighters and child care providers. Many of these
states have expressly left the clergy-communicant privilege intact
while imposing stringent reporting duties on a host of secular
entities. Several of them, however, have destroyed the
clergy-communicant privilege while simultaneously preserving
the attorney-client privilege. This article examines the constitu-
tional implications of reporting statutes that fall into this latter
category.
Mandatory reporting schemes have been hotly debated in con-
texts other than free exercise. Issues related to the efficacy of
mandatory reporting laws have been amply discussed elsewhere, 21
and are beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this article at-
tempts to analyze the constitutionality of certain reporting laws
utilizing the neutrality and general applicability requirements
that steer current free exercise doctrine. The unique design of re-
porting laws that treat spiritual and legal counselors differently
furnishes an optimal crucible for measuring the sensitivity of the
nondiscrimination principle to unjustifiable disparities in treat-
ment. The Court has left several tell-tale signs in the post-Smith
era that the Free Exercise Clause has been whittled down to pro-
tect against only those laws abounding with animus, and not nec-
essarily against those laws that contain more subtle prejudices, or
more finely drawn devaluations of the reasons for engaging in re-
ligious conduct. 22 All things considered, the nondiscrimination rule
appears extremely limited; thus, there may be renewed cause to
believe the rule of Smith should be seriously reevaluated. Or at
least that is the burden of this article.
This article consists of five sections. Section I examines the
strict scrutiny exceptions to the Smith rule of rational basis re-
view for generally applicable laws that incidentally burden certain
forms of religiously motivated conduct. Furthermore, Section I ex-
amines the philosophical bases of the majority opinion in Smith
21. See generally Victor I. Vieth, Passover in Minnesota: Mandatory Re-
porting and the Unequal Protection of Abused Children, 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 131 (1998); Steven J. Singley, Comment, Failure to Report Suspected
Child Abuse: Civil Liability of Mandatory Reporters, 19 J. Juv. L. 236 (1998).
22. Infra Part V.
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from the standpoint of its principal author, Justice Scalia. Section
II of this article discusses the ostensible meaning of the neutrality
and general applicability requirements in Smith and Lukumi. Sec-
tion III examines two Third Circuit decisions, Fraternal Order of
Police v. Newark23 and Tenafly Eruv Association, Inc. v. Borough
of Tenafly, 24 that provide credible bases for extending the non-
persecution principle well beyond the facts of Lukumi. Section IV
provides an overview of mandatory reporting laws at the state-
level, compares the attorney-client and clergy-communicant privi-
leges, and proposes a cogent methodology for assessing the consti-
tutionality of mandatory reporting laws consistent with current
free exercise doctrine. Section V analyzes the impact of the newly
minted Locke v. Davey25 on the Court's free exercise doctrine, a
case that could likely result in even greater governmental burdens
upon religiously motivated conduct. Finally, the conclusion of this
article argues that a free exercise challenge to the various manda-
tory reporting laws that abrogate the clergy-communicant privi-
lege while preserving the attorney-client privilege may prompt the
Court to reexamine, or at least qualify, the rational basis test es-
tablished in Smith.
I. SMITH AND THE RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS TO RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW
Smith arose from the denial of unemployment benefits to
members of the Native American Church for engaging in the sac-
ramental ingestion of peyote in violation of an employment policy
and Oregon's "controlled substance" prohibition. 26 The religious
claimants sought an exemption under the Oregon law based on
the Sherbert standard whereby only a "compelling state interest"27
and a lack of "alternative forms of regulation"28 could justify "sub-
stantial infringement"29 on religious exercise. Because illegal traf-
fic in peyote was virtually nonexistent, 30 the State's health and
safety reasons for denying a narrow exemption for its sacramental
23. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
24. 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
25. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
26. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
27. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
28. Id. at 407.
29. Id.
30. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("There is...
practically no illegal traffic in peyote.").
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use could scarcely have been deemed "compelling."
But Justice Scalia, authoring the majority opinion in Smith,
dodged heightened scrutiny altogether and altered the doctrinal
landscape: "[T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individ-
ual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)." 31
The Court thereby refused "to breathe into Sherbert some life be-
yond the unemployment compensation field."32 In addition to
claims arising in unemployment compensation systems of "indi-
vidualized exemptions" that utilize a "good cause" standard for
eligibility,3 3 strict scrutiny analysis after Smith applies only to
"governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such,"34 free exer-
cise challenges involving a "hybrid-right,"35 laws requiring the
"compelled expression"36of certain beliefs, and to laws prohibiting
religiously motivated behavior that fail the neutrality/general ap-
plicability test.37
31. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
32. Id. at 884.
33. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
34. Id. at 877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
35. Id. at 881.
The only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable
law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in con-
junction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom
of speech and of the press (citations omitted), or the right of
parents... to direct the education of their children.
Id.
36. Id. ("Some of our cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided
exclusively upon free speech grounds, have also involved freedom of
religion.").
37. See id. at 878-80. Smith has also been interpreted as preserving
"church autonomy" or institutional decisions involving religious property and
personnel. See id.at 877 ("The government may not ... lend its power to one
or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma."); see
also, Ira C. Lupu, The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Lib-
erty, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 565, 576 (1999). Lupu explained:
[N]o court in the last decade has held [Smith] to have un-
dermined the pre-existing constitutional principles of church
autonomy in matters of property or personnel .... [D] espite
Title VII's generally applicable ban on sex discrimination in
employment, Smith will not require the Catholic Church or
2004]
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A. The Hybrid-Right Exception
Smith supposedly carved out a strict scrutiny niche for "hy-
brid-right" situations in which a free exercise claim is bound to a
constitutionally protected "communicative activity or parental
right."3s Scalia, however, made no attempt in Smith to explain the
logic of a rule conditioning religious liberty on the fortuitous colli-
sion of free exercise and another colorable constitutional claim. In
the post-Smith era, the freewheeling hybrid-right exception has
left the lower federal courts hopelessly perplexed, and most of
them have given the exception little or no credence. 39 Justice
Souter has identified the ineluctable flaw of the hybrid-right ex-
ception:
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitu-
tional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception
would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith
rule .... But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant
would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neu-
tral, generally applicable law under another constitu-
tional provision, then there would have been no reason
for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have
mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.40
Scalia concluded in Smith that the communal ingestion of
peyote is not sufficiently communicative or expressive to trigger
the hybrid exception. 41 Conversely, religiously impelled anti-
government epithets would be entitled to the utmost constitu-
tional protection quite apart from any free exercise dimension. In
theory, then, the hybrid-right exception may cover a hitherto un-
charted middle ground between the donning of a yarmulke or the
Orthodox Jewish congregations to allow women into the
clergy.
Id.
38. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
39. See Jonathan B. Hensley, Comment, Approaches to the Hybrid-Rights
Doctrine in Free Exercise Cases, 68 TENN. L. REV. 119, 138 (2000) ("Only a
few.., decisions have earnestly tried to make sense of the vague dicta in
Smith about hybrid situations.... ").
40. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
41. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 ("The present case does not present such a
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communica-
tive activity or parental right.").
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ingestion of peyote, and outright religious speech.42 In Wisconsin
v. Yoder,43 one of the decisions that Scalia distinguished on the
"hybrid-right" basis,44 the Court recognized that "there are areas
of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control,
even under regulations of general applicability."45 Thus, the hy-
brid-exception is perhaps rightly regarded as an insincere and in-
artful attempt to distinguish undesirable precedent. 46 Practically
speaking, few courts and commentators consider the hybrid-right
exception to be a viable route for proponents of religious liberty.47
As such, it is a remnant of Smith bereft of any real vigor.
B. The "Hollow Freedom" of Religious Belief
The Court has consistently proclaimed the fundamentality of
religious belief, affording it the utmost protection. 48 Fortunately,
this absolutist ethos emerged from Smith completely unscathed. 49
Perhaps the most enduring conceptual nexus between the Relig-
ions Clauses has been the "inviolable citadel of the individual
heart and mind,"50 which is besieged both when the machinery of
government is used to impose a religious orthodoxy on its citizens
(such as laws favoring theistic prayer),51 and when the govern-
ment discriminates on the basis of religious viewpoint. 52 Religious
42. See Beerworth, supra note 19, at 372.
43. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
44. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
45. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (emphasis added).
46. Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Su-
preme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 267 (1993).
47. See Timothy J. Santoli, Note, A Decade After Employment Division v.
Smith: Examining How Courts are Still Grappling with the Hybrid-Rights
Exception to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 34 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 649, 672 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) ("The door of
the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental
regulation of religious beliefs as such."); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,
603 (1960) ("[T]he freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute.").
49. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 ("The free exercise of religion means, first
and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one
desires.").
50. Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226
(1963).
51. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
52. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 ("It would be true... that a State would
20041
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conscience, unlike religious conduct, is constitutionally impervious
to governmental coercion.
The revered status of religious conscience, however, has often
been of little avail from the standpoint of the believer. In Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,53 the Court upheld
the Forest Service's road-building and timber-harvesting project
on government land that had been a sacred site of the centuries-
old Yurok, Tolowa and Karok religions.54 The Court acknowledged
the fact that road construction over the hallowed parcels posed an
"extremely grave" threat to Native American religious practices, 55
but consolingly reminded the religious claimants of their inviola-
ble freedom to believe.56 As Justice Brennan so eloquently wrote in
his Lyng dissent: "that freedom amounts to nothing more than the
right to believe that their religion will be destroyed." 57 So long as
the body is not at liberty to obey the spiritual dictates of the mind,
the oft-touted liberty of conscience is what Brennan termed a "hol-
low freedom"5 8 for many religious citizens.
Under Smith, religiously motivated conduct is not entitled to
heightened scrutiny unless the claimant can show that its legal
proscription is not neutral or not generally applicable.5 9 This be-
lief/conduct distinction is akin to the speech/conduct distinction in
free speech jurisprudence and weakens the Free Exercise Clause
in two major respects. First, such a distinction flies directly in the
face of the plain meaning6 ° and original understanding61 of the
be 'prohibiting the free exercise of [of religion]' if it sought to ban such acts or
abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only be-
cause of the religious belief that they display.").
53. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
54. Id. at 446.
55. Id. at 451.
56. Id. at 453.
57. Id. at 477 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
58. Id. ("The safeguarding of such a hollow freedom... fails utterly to
accord with the dictates of the First Amendment."); see Beerworth, supra note
19, at 370.
59. Smith, 494 U.S.at 879.
60. See id., 494 U.S. at 893 (O'Connor J., concurring) ("Because the First
Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious con-
duct, conduct motivated by sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must
be at least presumptively protected by the Free Exercise Clause.").
61. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S 520, 575-576. In his concurrence, Justice Souter stated:
There appears to be a strong argument from the Clause's
MANDATORY REPORTING LAWS
Free Exercise Clause. On a purely textual plane, the Clause en-
compasses religious belief and conduct, thereby requiring (at a
minimum) a rigorous balancing test presumptively protecting re-
ligiously impelled action, irrespective of a law's character.62 Sec-
ond, the belief/conduct dichotomy relegates the Clause to the
function of protecting religion in its expressive manifestations,
thereby placing religion under the rubric of free speech. Equating
religion with speech in this manner has led to a kind of doctrinal
conflation whereby free exercise has been eclipsed by the dis-
tinctly free speech hallmarks of viewpoint neutrality63 and expres-
sive association.64 This doctrinal conflation (or confusion), though
protective of religious belief, "undermines our commitment to the
idea that there is something unique and distinctive about religion
in life and in constitutional law."65
C. Neutrality and General Applicability: Free Exercise as Equal
Protection
All laws that fail the neutrality or general applicability re-
quirements "must be justified by a compelling governmental in-
terest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest."66
development in the First Congress, from its origins in the
post-Revolution state constitutions and pre-Revolution colo-
nial charters, and from the philosophy of rights to which the
Framers adhered, that the Clause was originally understood
to preserve a right to engage in activities necessary to fulfill
one's duty to one's God, unless those activities threatened
the rights of others or the serious needs of the State.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring). See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins
and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1409 (1990) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause was originally understood
as protecting action as well as belief, namely through mandatory exemptions
from generally applicable laws); Beerworth, supra note 19, at 373.
62. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
63. See Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 845-46 (1995) (holding that exclusion of a student religious magazine
from university program covering printing costs of similar nonreligious publi-
cations constituted viewpoint discrimination under the Free Speech Clause).
64. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-77 (1981) (holding uncon-
stitutional, on an expressive association rationale, a university policy exclud-
ing student religious groups from an "open forum" on campus).
65. Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of
Free Speech Doctrine and Formal Neutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 184 (2002).
66. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531-532.
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The Court in Lukumi recognized that general applicability - the
animating theme of free exercise doctrine - leads inexorably to a
distinctly "equal protection mode of analysis."67 Indeed, the
Court's opinion in Lukumi is replete with equal protection allu-
sions, particularly as it grapples with problems of overbreadth68
and underinclusion. 69 The Free Exercise Clause is cast as a bul-
wark against "unequal treatment"70 and an antidote for the "evil"
of a "prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [a reli-
gious minority] but not upon itself."71
Justice Scalia, the creator of the general applicability rule as
applied within the free exercise context,72 offered two illustrations
of the protective dynamic of free exercise doctrine after its permu-
tation in Smith: the Free Exercise Clause, he conceded, would
compel invalidation of a ban on the "casting of 'statues that are to
be used for worship purposes,"'73 and a prohibition on prostrating
oneself before a golden calf.74 These hypothetical enactments,
however, are patently violative of long-established free exercise
and equal protection principles. 75 The Carolene Products philoso-
phy contemplated application of "a more searching judicial in-
quiry" for "statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities."76 The Warren Court, in particular, realized the
necessity of utilizing a heightened scrutiny standard when the
Madisonian model of pluralistic bargaining collapsed under com-
67. Id. at 540.
68. See id. at 538 ("We also find significant evidence of the ordinances'
improper targeting of Santeria sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe more
religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated ends.").
69. See id. at 543 (finding the ordinances "underinclusive" for the ends of
public health and preventing cruelty to animals because "[tlhey fail to pro-
hibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or
greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does.").
70. Id. at 542 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480
U.S. 136, 148 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
71. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 545 (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,
542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
72. For Scalia's discussion on the general applicability rule, see Smith,
494 U.S. 878-82.
73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-878.
74. See id. at 878.
75. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Is-
land, 345 U.S. 67, 69 (1953).
76. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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mon prejudices against certain racial, ethnic and religious
groups. 77 Thus, religion was treated as a suspect class for Four-
teenth Amendment purposes well before Smith, quite apart from
its explicit protection within the First Amendment.
Lukumi places religion-specific classifications on par with
race-specific classifications - both of which are to be strictly scru-
tinized using equal protection analysis 78 - and the Free Exercise
Clause becomes something of a constitutional tautology. 79 Under
the race model, disparate treatment challenges to facially neutral
laws must show a "racially discriminatory intent or purpose."80
But just as "disproportionate impact ... is not the sole touchstone
of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitu-
tion,"81 so it is that the Lukumi model for religion requires proof of
a discriminatory intent or purpose.8 2 Both models permit infer-
ences of a discriminatory purpose "from the totality of the relevant
facts,"8 3 or "from both direct and circumstantial evidence."84 In the
end, Smith and Lukumi do not add any protections to the Free
Exercise Clause; they simply allow judicial enforcement of a pre-
existing bare essential, namely the "fundamental nonpersecution
principle."8 5 And, it seems, the Equal Protection Clause is the
preferable means by which to enforce it. Consequently, the Free
Exercise Clause has become a platitudinous provision devoid of
any independent potency.
77. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 79-81 (1980); Beerworth, supra note 19, at 359.
78. The Court has held that even benign religion and race-specific classi-
fications violate principles of formal neutrality and equality. See Bd. of Ed. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994) (invalidating a pro-religious gerrymander
delegating school district authority to a sect of Hasidic Jews under the Estab-
lishment Clause); cf. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)
(holding, on equal protection grounds, that all governmental race based "af-
firmative action" policies must survive "strict scrutiny").
79. See Beerworth, supra note 19, at 377.
80. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977).
81. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
82. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540.
83. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
84. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 540.
85. Id. at 523.
20041
86 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.10:73
D. Smith and the Scalian Conception of Judicial Discretion
Smith allows democratic majorities to prohibit religious prac-
tices to their liking so long as the prohibition is generally applica-
ble.8 6 The religious citizen has been lost in the vicissitudes of
judicial process because there is no qualitative difference to her
between a persecutory law and a generally applicable one. Under
either scheme, she is forced to render to Caesar that which most
emphatically belongs to God. As Justice O'Connor reminded the
Court in Smith, "[a] person who is barred from engaging in relig-
iously motivated conduct.., is barred from exercising his religion
regardless of whether the law prohibits the conduct only when en-
gaged in for religious reasons, only by members of that religion, or
by all persons."87
Smith, however, is justifiable on some levels. Scalia voiced a
valid concern in Smith that a continued weak application of the
"compelling interest" test in free exercise cases could spill over
into other contexts, such as for content-based restrictions on
speech or race-specific classifications, producing a kind of cross-
doctrinal dilution.88 Scalia also expressed a profound distaste for
discretionary balancing tests: "[Ilt is horrible to contemplate that
federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of
general laws the significance of religious practice."8 9 What Scalia
might have found so "horrible" was the prospect of judges masking
their predilections and prejudices toward certain religions (or re-
ligion generally) in easily manipulated and nebulous balancing
tests.9° The discretion to judge the relative weight of competing in-
terests (religious and governmental) is also the discretion to dis-
86. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. The Court stated:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the po-
litical process will place at a relative disadvantage those re-
ligious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to
a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against
the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Id.
87. Id. at 893 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. See id. at 888 ("[W]atering down [the compelling state interest test]
would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied.").
89. Id. at 889 n.5.
90. See Beerworth, supra note 19, at 377-78.
MANDATORY REPORTING LAWS
criminate, especially against religious practices that offend pre-
vailing social mores.
The specter of judicially imposed value judgments, along with
the oft-repeated fear of promoting "a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself,"91 led Scalia to the solution of "leaving
accommodation to the political process." 92 The Smith majority's
preference for legislative accommodation of religious liberty
meshes nicely with Scalia's broader judicial philosophy. Scalia has
forcefully advocated the "democratic government" solution in other
areas in which certain "liberty interests" are at stake. For exam-
ple, he has sharply criticized the "undue burden" standard used in
the Court's abortion jurisprudence as an "amorphous" 93 and "in-
herently standardless" inquiry that "invites the .. . judge to give
effect to his personal preferences about abortion."94 As with relig-
ion, he has proposed a "state-by-state resolution"95 of the abortion
matter because the "permissibility of abortion, and the limitations
upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our
democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then
voting."96
Advancing a similar argument against a constitutionally rec-
ognized liberty interest to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, Scalia has expounded a theory of democratic government
and of the role of the federal judiciary:
Our salvation is the Equal Protection Clause, which re-
quires the democratic majority to accept for themselves
and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.
This Court need not, and has no authority to, inject itself
into every field of human activity where irrationality and
oppression may theoretically occur, and if it tries to do so
it will destroy itself.97
Smith effectively incorporates this Scalian conception of judi-
91. Id. at 890.
92. Id.
93. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
94. Id. at 992.
95. Id. at 995.
96. Id. at 979.
97. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300-01
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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cial discretion by giving the content of the Free Exercise Clause to
the "democratic majority," subject only to the strictures of the
Equal Protection Clause. Scalia concedes that this concept toler-
ates some modicum of "irrationality and oppression" as an "un-
avoidable consequence of democratic government."98 In the context
of religion, "those religious practices that are not widely engaged
in" are placed "at a relative disadvantage" 99 because religious mi-
norities lack the political capital necessary to procure exemptions
from generally applicable laws. As noted above, Scalia advances a
very convincing argument for judicial restraint in the context of
reproductive rights and the right to die, both of which have arisen
under the broader right to privacy rubric. He asserts that any de-
tached observer armed with the text or original understanding of
the Due Process Clause is forced to conclude that the Constitution
is inscrutably silent even with regard to the threshold question of
whether there is some "right to privacy" in the first place.100 Of
course, this argument cannot be tenably advanced against the
right to practice one's religion free from governmental intrusion, a
right anchored more cognizably in the text and history of the Con-
stitution.
It is one thing to decry the dubious exegetical vacuum that is
substantive due process analysis, but it is quite another to ignore
rights explicitly rooted in the constitutional text.10' Of course, reli-
gious freedom falls within this latter category. The Smith majority
glossed over this important distinction and granted the majori-
tarian process considerable latitude in an area in which the Con-
stitution quite unequivocally maintains that the free exercise of
religion is to be prohibited by "no law." On the battleground of
Smith, Scalia's textualist creed clashed irreconcilably with his "re-
straintist" convictions, and the impulse to cabin judicial discretion
prevailed over his usual preference for textual fidelity.
98. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
99. Id.
100. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAw 39 (1997).
101. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Pro-
grams: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 136 (1992).
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II. DEFINING THE CONCEPTS OF NEUTRALITY AND GENERAL
APPLICABILITY
The Court in Smith gave little meaningful content to the con-
cepts of neutrality and general applicability. But Smith is illumi-
nating in at least two respects. First, the so-called "generally
applicable" Oregon drug prohibition itself contained an exception
for substances prescribed by a medical practitioner.10 2 The fact
that the Oregon law was not free from exceptions, considered
alongside the fact that peyote had no medicinal value, raises the
question of just how closely related a nonreligious exception must
be to a prohibition on religious exercise in order to fail the general
applicability test. The Smith Court made no effort to determine
whether the sacramental use of peyote undermined health and
safety concerns any more or less than the medicinal use of other
hallucinogenic drugs. 0 3 Would an exception premised on the me-
dicinal usefulness of peyote have furnished such a basis? More
questions spring from this seemingly inessential feature of Smith.
For instance, can a single nonreligious exception ever fail the
Smith test, or must there be several exceptions cut into a law for
it to shed its generally applicable character? Or is the thrust of
Smith that a law becomes constitutionally suspect upon a finding
that a nonreligious exemption actually thwarts the purported gov-
ernmental interests in regulating similar, but religiously moti-
vated, conduct?
Second, the Court in Smith seemed to relate the necessity of
heightened scrutiny to the type of regulatory scheme at issue.
Among the Court's reasons for confining the compelling interest
standard to the unemployment compensation context was that the
"good cause" standard for determining compensation benefits eli-
gibility "'created a mechanism for individualized exemptions. '" 10 4
In such a context-dependent and potentially value-laden exemp-
tion system, a state "may not refuse to extend that system to cases
102. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
103. Id. The Oregon statute under review in Smith defined a "controlled
substance" as "a drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Con-
trolled Substances Act." ORE. REV. STAT. § 475.005(6) (1987) (citing 21 U.S.C.
§§ 811-812). However, the statute provided a general exemption for sub-
stances "prescribed by a medical practitioner." Id. § 475.992(4).
104. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708
(1986)).
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of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."10 5 The Court
couched the unemployment compensation cases in terms of gen-
eral applicability10 6 but failed to indicate whether individualized
exemption systems are illustrative or exhaustive of the types of
laws that are not generally applicable under Smith. It would not
be extravagant to maintain that the general applicability re-
quirement might be so limited as to insulate categorical exemp-
tions from ready constitutional challenges. 107 Indeed, at least two
federal circuit courts have concluded that the non-discrimination
principle of Smith does not apply to regulatory schemes containing
"objectively-defined categories" of selection. 108
A. The "Easy" Case of Lukumi
Lukumi involved four city ordinances drafted for the specific
purpose of prohibiting sacrificial animal slaughter, a central ritual
of the Santeria religion. 0 9 In a concurring opinion, Justice Black-
mun (in conjunction with Justice O'Connor) pointed out that the
Lukumi case was "an easy one to decide." 10 As the Court con-
cluded, the "ordinances by their own terms target [Santeria] reli-
gious exercise""' and "it is only conduct motivated by religious
conviction that bears the weight of the governmental restric-
tions."1 2 In other words, Lukumi involved a form of outright per-
secution, not merely unconscious prejudice.
The Court stated that the "minimum requirement of neutral-
ity is that a law not discriminate on its face."" 3 Although the
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thornburgh, 951 F.2d 957, 961 (9th Cir.
1991).
108. Id.; Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 701
(10th Cir. 1998) (holding that Sherbert is inapplicable in the absence of "a
system of individualized exceptions that give rise to the application of a sub-jective test.").
109. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 526-28 (1993).
110. Id. at 580 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("It is only in the rare case that
a state or local legislature will enact a law directly burdening religious prac-
tice as such. Because respondent here does single out religion in this way, the
present case is an easy one to decide.") (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 542.
112. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 533.
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Court noted the "strong religious connotations" of certain lan-
guage referring to "ritual" and "sacrifice," textual analysis alone
was a thin reed upon which to build a case for a religion-specific
classification. 1 14 Declaring that "the effect of a law in its real op-
eration is strong evidence of its object,"115 the Court plunged into
the circumstances surrounding the enactments and their func-
tional effect to infer invidious motivation."16 The willingness of the
Court in Lukumi to go beyond purely textual analysis sheds some
light on the meaning of the neutrality requirement: facial dis-
crimination is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for appli-
cation of strict scrutiny. Although the Court conflates the twin
Smith requirements to a considerable degree in Lukumi," 7 neu-
trality seems to entail textual analysis as well as substantive re-
view to ferret out animus, with particular attention directed at the
overinclusive attributes of a given classification.1 8 Gleaning from
the "events preceding their enactment" that "the ordinances were
enacted 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' their suppression of
Santeria religious practice," the Court deduced that they were
"not neutral."119
Lukumi suggests the general applicability test is really one of
"fit" between legislative means and ends. The Court revealed the
discordant relationship between the classifications drawn by the
ordinances and their purported objectives:
[The city] claims that [the ordinances] ... advance two
114. Id. at 533-34.
115. Id. at 535.
116. Id. at 534-35 ("The record in this case compels the conclusion that
suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the
object of the ordinances.").
117. See id. at 531 ("Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated,
and... failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other
has not been satisfied.").
118. See id. at 542. The Court held:
[Thelordinances are not neutral because the ordinances by
their own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of
the ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe
religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secu-
lar killings; and the ordinances suppress much more reli-
gious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the
legitimate ends asserted in their defense.
Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 540.
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interests: protecting the public health and preventing
cruelty to animals. The ordinances are underinclusive for
those ends. They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that
endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree
than Santeria sacrifice does. 120
If the general applicability test is essentially a hunt for under-
inclusiveness, then strict scrutiny is triggered by secular excep-
tions that actually frustrate legislative ends in a roughly commen-
surate or more deleterious manner when compared to religiously
inspired conduct that is subject to the law. 121 The ordinances in
Lukumi exempted secular and kosher slaughter even though such
conduct threatened the asserted interests in public health and in
the prevention of animal cruelty. 22 Santeria animal sacrifice was
analogous in all relevant respects to the exempted forms of animal
slaughter; thus, the Court found sufficient evidence of "discrimi-
natory treatment"' 23 in the apparent devaluation of religious rea-
sons for engaging in animal slaughter (or conversely, in the
excessive overvaluation of secular reasons for doing so). Indeed,
the ordinances in Lukumi were doubly flawed in terms of fit. They
were overinclusive as well in proscribing Santeria slaughter "even
when it [did] not threaten the city's interest in the public
health." 24
The substantially overinclusive and underinclusive attributes
of the ordinances, coupled with the traditional practice of judicial
minimalism,' 25 allowed the Court to duck the more cumbersome
task of fine-tuning the general applicability doctrine: "[W]e need
120. Id. at 543.
121. See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exer-
cise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 850, 867 (2001).
122. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 536-37.
123. Id. at 537-39.
124. Id. at 538-39.
125. See Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113
U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
[Tihe Court... is bound by two rules, to which it has rigidly
adhered: one, never to anticipate a question of constitu-
tional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the
other never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be ap-
plied.
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not define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a
prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well
below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amend-
ment rights."126 Thus, there are essentially two free exercise max-
ims to take from Lukumi. The first is that the neutrality test
contemplates the use of circumstantial evidence. The second is
that "[1]egislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised,
designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices."1 27
In Lukumi, the distinction drawn between religious and secu-
lar animal slaughter was constitutionally irrelevant, and therefore
infirm, because these forms of slaughter posed virtually identical
threats to animal cruelty and public health interests. 128 So, per-
haps Lukumi reveals that the touchstone of the neutrality and
general applicability requirements is that a law must not be un-
derinclusive in exempting certain secular conduct that frustrates
legislative purposes to a comparable or greater degree than would
an exemption for religious conduct. 129 If this is so, the nondis-
crimination rule of Smith presupposes some dissonance between
the exceptions and the proffered legislative goals. The Lukumi
Court applied strict scrutiny because the myriad nonreligious
exceptions produced an anti-religious gerrymander of "substantial,
not inconsequential," underinclusion. 30 But again, it seemed an
"easy case" decided on the narrowest of grounds. However, the
Lukumi Court did not explain what sorts of underinclusive classi-
fications were "inconsequential," nor did it identify a point at
which underinclusion became consequential enough to become
constitutionally problematic.
The Lukumi Court was somewhat ambivalent as to whether
the general applicability requirement extends beyond individual-
ized exemption systems. The Lukumi Court remarked concerning
one of the ordinances: "because it requires an evaluation of the
particular justification for the [animal] killing, this ordinance
represents a system of 'individualized governmental assessment of
the reasons for the relevant conduct."'" 3' On the other hand, only
126. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
127. Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
128. See id. at 543-45.
129. See Beerworth, supra note 19, at 379.
130. Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 537 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
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one of the four ordinances fit this mold and the Court later stated,
"categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has
the incidental effect of burdening a religious practice."132 Because
the Court in Lukumi relied on categorical exceptions for fishing
within the city, for exterminations of mice and rats within the
home, for medical science experiments, and for euthanasia of cer-
tain animals,133 the neutrality and general applicability require-
ments most likely extend to categorical exemption systems as
well. Indeed, "[w]holesale secular exceptions make the law even
less generally applicable than individualized secular excep-
tions."134
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF NEUTRALITY AND
GENERAL APPLICABILITY
In two recent cases, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has in-
terpreted the non-persecution principle of Lukumi fairly broadly.
In Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark,135 two Islamic po-
lice officers fulfilled a religious obligation to grow their beards 36
and were subsequently reprimanded pursuant to an internal order
prohibiting full beards, goatees, and other facial hair growth aside
from mustaches and sideburns. 137 The order contained two excep-
tions: one for undercover officers and another for sufferers of
pseudo folliculitis barbae (PFB), a medical condition endemic to
African and Arab-Americans with curly facial hair.138 PFB occurs,
if at all, when shaving sharpens stubble that eventually grows
back into the skin; abstention from shaving allows facial hair to
grow to lengths at which PFB is no longer possible. 39
The Newark Police Department asserted interests in uniform-
ity, discipline and esprit de corps. 40 The undercover officer excep-
(1990)).
132. Id. at 542 (emphasis added).
133. Id. at 543-44.
134. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40
CATHOLIC LAW. 25, 32 (2000).
135. 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).
136. Id. at 360-61 ("The refusal by a Sunni Muslim male who can grow a
beard, to wear one is a major sin ... the penalties will be meted out by Al-
lah.").
137. See id. at 360.
138. See id.
139. See Lund, supra note 15, at 647.
140. See Newark, 170 F.3d at 366.
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tion to the no-beard policy did not threaten these goals because
"undercover officers 'obviously are not held out to the public as law
enforcement personnel.'" 141 The medical exemption, however, ines-
capably jeopardized the "uniform appearance" rationale. "[T]he
medical exemption raises concern," the Court stated, "because it
indicates that the Department has made a value judgment that
secular (i.e., medical) motivations for wearing a beard are impor-
tant enough to overcome its general interest in uniformity but
that religious motivations are not."142 The Department attempted
to tie "uniformity of appearance" to the public interest in a "sense
of security in having readily identifiable and trusted public ser-
vants."143 The Court summarily rejected this argument, saying
that "[u]niformed officers, whether bearded or clean-shaven,
should be readily identifiable." 44 But the strength of the stated in-
terests was beside the point because the religious and medical ex-
emptions posed similar threats to the proffered objectives of the
order. In other words, the central problem was one of tailoring, not
of interest. The secular/religious distinction, because inexplicable
in relation to the purpose of the order, appeared to be rooted in a
desire "to suppress manifestations of the religious diversity that
the First Amendment safeguards." 45 The order's underinclusive-
ness in favor of secular conduct was therefore sufficient to trigger
heightened scrutiny. 46
Newark is a consistent, albeit broad, interpretation of Lu-
kumi. The Court in Newark acknowledged the "individualized ex-
emption" rule implicit in Smith and Lukumi, but noted that the
overarching concern in those cases "was the prospect of the gov-
ernment's deciding that secular motivations are more important
than religious motivations." 47 The Newark Court went on to rea-
son, "this concern is only further implicated when the government
does not merely create a mechanism for individualized exemp-





145. Id. at 367.
146. The court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny "since this case
arose in the public employment context." Id. at 366 n.7.
147. Id. at 365.
2004]
96 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.10:73
dividuals with a secular objection but not for individuals with a
religious objection."'148 Moreover, the no-beard policy did not solely
target religious conduct by exempting all (or even most) secular
motivations for shaving. Indeed, the single problematic secular
exemption was sufficient to invoke the nondiscrimination princi-
ple of Smith. Recall the Lukumi Court's statement that anti-
religious gerrymanders "fall well below the minimum standard"
laid out in Smith. 49 Newark synthesized Smith and Lukumi in a
way that highlighted the thrust of general applicability. In distin-
guishing the facts in Newark from those in Smith, the Third Cir-
cuit opined that Oregon's medical prescription exception to the
drug prohibition did "not necessarily undermine Oregon's interest
in curbing the unregulated use of dangerous drugs,"150 whereas
the secular and kosher animal slaughter exceptions in Lukumi -
like the PFB exception in Newark - plainly frustrated the respec-
tive regulatory goals.15'
Newark also illuminates the brittle logic upon which Smith
rests. 152 For example, the Islamic officers were granted an exemp-
tion from the no-beard policy because a medical exemption for the
skin condition, PFB, had previously been made.' 53 However, the
medical exemption would not have existed in the first place had
the occurrence of PFB in the city been minimal or nonexistent.
That is, the religious claimants could not have prevailed had the
climate and demographics of the city in which they were employed
not been conducive to the prevalence of PFB.154 A favorable out-
come depended on the fortuitous existence of some significant
secular burden that prompted the creation of a secular exemption.
Had an identical fact-pattern arisen in Alaska or Wisconsin where
PFB is virtually nonexistent, there would have been no secular
exemption and, by extension, no victory for religious liberty. 155 The
departmental order would have remained generally applicable.
148. Id.
149. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 543 (1993).
150. Newark, 170 F.3d at 366.
151. See id.
152. Lund, supra note 15, at 649.
153. Newark, 170 F.3d at 366.
154. Lund, supra note 15, at 647-48.
155. Id.at 647-49.
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In Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 15 6 the Third
Circuit continued to interpret neutrality and general applicability
in a relatively expansive manner. Tenafly involved a facially neu-
tral town ordinance prohibiting "any sign or advertisement, or
other matter upon any pole, tree, curbstone, sidewalk or else-
where, in any public place, excepting such as may be authorized
by this or any other ordinance of the Borough."157 In practice,
however, the town had "tacitly or expressly granted exemptions
from the ordinance's unyielding language for various secular and
religious - though never Orthodox Jewish - purposes." 158 By mu-
nicipal order, the Orthodox Jewish residents of Tenafly were pro-
hibited from attaching lechis - "thin black strips made of the same
plastic material as, and nearly identical to, the coverings on ordi-
nary ground wires" 159 - to town utility poles. According to ancient
religious practice, lechis demarcate the boundaries of an eruv, a
space within which Sabbath observers may transport objects on
Yom Kippur or the Sabbath. 60 Without a well-defined eruv, Or-
thodox Jews who use strollers, wheelchairs, walkers and canes are
unable to leave their homes and attend synagogue.' 6'
Reaffirming the Newark doctrine that "government offi-
cials... contravene the neutrality requirement if they exempt
some secularly motivated conduct but not comparable religiously
motivated conduct," the Court invalidated the ordinance. 62
From the drab house numbers and lost animal signs to
the more obtrusive holiday displays, church directional
signs, and orange ribbons ... the Borough has allowed
private citizens to affix various materials to its utility
poles. Apart from their religious nature, the lechis are
comparable to the postings the Borough has left in place.
If anything, the lechis are less of a problem because they
are so unobtrusive; even observant Jews are often unable
156. 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002).
157. Id. at 151 (quoting TENAFLY, N.J., ORDINANCE 691 art. VIII § 7
(1954)).
158. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 152.
160. Id. at 152.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 165-66.
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to distinguish them from ordinary utility wires. 163
The town contended that the lechis were intended to be
permanent fixtures, but the Court determined that at least the
"house numbers nailed to utility poles are intended to be perma-
nent."16 4 Thus, the various secular and would-be Orthodox Jewish
exceptions frustrated the town's interest in monolithic, fixture-
free utility poles to at least a comparable degree, thereby implicat-
ing the nondiscrimination principle. Tenafly is perhaps most nota-
ble, however, for its holding that "[u]nder Smith and
Lukumi... there is no substantial burden requirement when gov-
ernment discriminates against religious conduct,"1 65 and concomi-
tantly, that there is no "compulsory" practice requirement. 166 In
other words, the Free Exercise Clause applies with equal force to
even the slightest burden on even an "optional" religious practice,
so long as there is a "sincere desire" to engage in that practice. 167
As to the suspension of the "substantial burden" requirement,
Tenafly is a particularly ambitious exposition of free exercise doc-
trine because the vast majority of federal circuit courts have re-
tained the requirement as an indispensable component of the
Smith-Lukumi methodology. 168
IV. STATE MANDATORY REPORTING LAWS ON CHILD ABUSE
All fifty States have enacted statutes preserving the clergy-
communicant privilege in some form or another. But when news
reports surfaced of Catholic clergy having engaged in and presided
over the sexual abuse of children for decades, public outrage and
strenuous pleas for accountability pervaded the political climate.
In the Boston Archdiocese alone, law enforcement officials cata-
logued 789 victims of abuse by Catholic priests and church work-
ers over the last sixty years, and the actual number of victims is
estimated to exceed 1,000.169 As the anti-clerical clamor intensi-
163. Id. at 167.
164. Id. at 167-68.
165. Id. at 170.
166. Id. at 171.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 170-71 & n.31.
169. Christopher R. Pudelski, Comment, The Constitutional Fate of Man-
datory Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a Post-
Smith World, 98 NW. U.L. REv. 703, 712-13 (2004).
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fled, many state legislatures returned to the drawing boards with
an eye toward bringing clergy within the scope of their mandatory
reporting laws. 170 The jurisdictions that have decided to impose a
general reporting duty on clergy have had to further decide
whether to extend the duty to confidential communications with
parishioners, or to retain the clergy-communicant privilege and
thereby avoid a direct conflict between God and Caesar.
Current mandatory reporting laws address this societal prob-
lem vis-A-vis clergy in at least three manners. One approach has
been to preserve the clergy-communicant privilege in full, either
by an explicit privilege-preservation clause, 171 or by omitting
clergy members from veritable laundry lists of mandatory report-
ers with no catchall clause.172 A second and widely shared strategy
has been to include clergy in the laundry list of professionals who
have a duty to report.173 A third approach has been either to omit
clergy from a list of reporters and bring them within the purview
of the law through inclusion of an "any person" catchall phrase, or
to eschew the laundry-list approach altogether for a sweeping re-
porting requirement applicable to "any person."174
170. See id. at 704.
171. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-507 (Michie 2003); FL. STAT. ANN. §
39.204 (West Supp. 2004); IDAHO CODE § 16-1619 (Michie 2001); LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art. 603 (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4011-A (West
2004); MD.CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-705 (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556
(West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2003); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 32A-4-3 (Michie 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (2003); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 62A-4a-403 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 § 4913 (Supp. 2003).
172. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (Michie 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5
(2003); HAw. REV. STAT. § 350-1.1 (2002); IOWA CODE § 232.69 (2002); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 (2002); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 413 (McKinney 2003);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (West 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 26-8A-3
(Michie 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV. CODE §
26-44.030 (West 2004).
173. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-3620 (West 2003); CAL. PENAL CODE §
11165.7 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304 (2003); CONN. GEN. SWAT.
ANN. § 17A-101 (West 2004); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (Supp. 2004); MASS.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.623 (West Supp. 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-353 (1999 &
Supp. 2003); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-
25.1-03 (1999); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6311 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-510 (LAw. Co-oP. 2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.101
(Vernon 2002).
174. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-33-5-1
(West 1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Michie 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §
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Concerns of a constitutional magnitude arise in the differen-
tial treatment of the legal and clerical privileges because some re-
porting laws expressly and fully preserve the attorney-client
privilege while completely or partially abrogating the clergy-
communicant privilege. 175 Complete abrogation of the clergy-
communicant privilege means that both "spiritual advice" and con-
fessional communications are vitiated for purposes of reporting
and for purposes of evidentiary admissibility in proceedings in-
volving allegations of child abuse or neglect. 176 Reporting laws
that completely abrogate the clergy-communicant privilege, while
fully preserving the attorney-client privilege, represent the apogee
of unequal treatment. Other reporting laws achieve a slightly
lower degree of inequality either by (1) completely preserving the
attorney-client privilege and only partially preserving the clergy-
communicant privilege, 177 or by (2) partially abrogating the attor-
ney-client privilege and completely abrogating the clergy-
communicant privilege.17 s Partial abrogation entails a suspension
of the privilege in either the reporting or evidentiary context.
A. North Carolina and Tennessee
North Carolina's reporting statute seemingly imposes a gen-
erally applicable duty to report on "any person or institution who
has cause to suspect that any juvenile is abused, neglected.., or
has died as the result of maltreatment." 79 However, a subsequent
section of the statute declares: "No privilege shall be grounds for
any person or institution to report... even if the knowledge or
suspicion is acquired in an official professional capacity, except
when the knowledge or suspicion is gained by an attorney from
28-711 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 202.882 (Michie 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:6-8.10 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7103 (West 2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2001); Wis. STAT. § 48.981 (West 2003); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 2003).
175. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-310 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:32
(2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-11 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-614 (2003);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-7 (Michie 2001).
176. See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-
Communicant Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes,
44 B.C. L. REV. 1127, 1149-50 (2003).
177. See, e.g., § 325 ILL. COmp. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (2004); ALA. CODE § 26-14-10
(2004).
178. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.202 (Vernon 2002).
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2004).
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that attorney's client."180 The statute further provides that "[n]o
privilege, except the attorney-client privilege, shall be grounds for
excluding evidence of abuse, neglect, or dependency in any judicial
proceeding."181
The Tennessee reporting statute also includes a catchall pro-
vision requiring "any person" with knowledge or suspicion of child
abuse to report such information to state authorities. 8 2 Moreover,
the Tennessee reporting law unambiguously abolishes the clergy-
communicant privilege by voiding the privileged quality of com-
munication between any professional person and his client, and
"any other privileged communication except that between attorney
and client" for reporting and evidentiary purposes. 8 3 Thus, both
North Carolina and Tennessee have achieved complete abrogation
of the clergy-communicant privilege on the one hand, and com-
plete preservation of the attorney-client privilege on the other.
B. Rhode Island, New Hampshire and West Virginia
Rhode Island has opted for a catchall clause in order to bring
clergy within the purview of the reporting duty. 8 4 It has com-
pletely vitiated the privileged quality of communications between
"any professional person and his or her patient or client, except
that between attorney and client."185 New Hampshire specifically
lists any "priest, minister, or rabbi"18 6 as mandated reporters and
suspends, for reporting and evidentiary purposes, all professional
privileges "except that between attorney and client."18 7 West Vir-
ginia includes clergy in an exhaustive list of mandated reporters
that does not include attorneys. 8 8 A subsequent provision of the
statute eviscerates the "privileged quality of communications...
between any professional person and his patient or his client, ex-
cept that between attorney and client." 8 9 Due to shoddy drafting,
it is more difficult to determine the extent to which West Virginia
180. Id. § 7B-310.
181. Id.
182. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-605(a) (2001).
183. Id. § 37-1-614(2001).
184. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-11-3 (2004).
185. Id. § 40-11-11.
186. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2003).
187. Id. § 169-C:32 (2003).
188. W. VA. CODE § 49-6A-2 (2003).
189. Id. § 49-6A-7.
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has suspended the clergy-communicant privilege. The statute de-
clares abrogation "in situations involving suspected or known
child abuse and neglect."'190 This language is certainly broad
enough to encompass both the reporting duty and issues of eviden-
tiary admissibility in proceedings related to child abuse, but its
notable lack of specificity renders its scope ambiguous.
Rhode Island, New Hampshire and West Virginia have pre-
served the attorney-client privilege and abolished all other privi-
leges between "any professional person and his or her patient or
client." If construed narrowly, the clergy-communicant privilege
might survive such abrogation clauses. On the other hand, these
statutes obligate clergy to report information relating to child
abuse, and they do so in the absence of either a partial or complete
privilege-preservation clause. Although susceptible to more than
one interpretation, these laws may be properly interpreted as
completely eviscerating the clergy-communicant privilege. 191
C. Alabama, Illinois and Texas
Like many other states, Alabama designates "members of the
clergy"192 as mandated reporters along with a host of secular
agents such as physicians, dentists, school teachers and officials,
law enforcement officials, pharmacists, social workers, day care
workers, mental health professionals and "any other person called
upon to render aid or medical assistance to any child."' 93 Attor-
neys are not listed and do not seem to be implicated by the profes-
sion-specific catchall clause. The Alabama statute thereafter
proclaims: "The doctrine of privileged communication, with the ex-
ception of the attorney-client privilege, shall not be ground for ex-
cluding any evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause
thereof in any judicial proceeding." 94 The statute does, however,
exempt members of the clergy from the reporting duty insofar as
the relevant information is "gained solely in a confidential com-
190. Id.
191. See Abrams, supra note 176, at 1140; see also Shawn P. Bailey, Note,
How Secrets are Kept: Viewing the Current Clergy-Penitent Privilege Through
a Comparison with the Attorney-Client Privilege, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REv. 489, 499
(2002).
192. ALA. CODE § 26-14-3(a) (2004).
193. Id.
194. Id. § 26-14-10.
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munication."195 By fully preserving the attorney-client privilege
and only partially abrogating the clergy-communicant privilege,
Alabama has settled for a slightly smaller quantum of differential
treatment.
Like Alabama, Illinois has preserved the attorney-client privi-
lege in its entirety while chipping away considerably at the clergy-
communicant privilege. A shrewdly worded section suspends the
"privileged quality of communication between any professional
person required to report and his patient or client" with respect to
the reporting duty. 196 The statute designates "any member of the
clergy" as a reporter but omits any reference to attorneys. 97 Al-
though the evidentiary dimension of the clergy-communicant
privilege remains intact,1 98 attorneys are free to use their profes-
sional privilege as a shield against the reporting duty and the
admissibility of evidence in court proceedings.
The Texas scheme explicitly cancels both the attorney-client
and clergy-communicant privilege with respect to the reporting
duty. 199 However, it also states "evidence may not be excluded on
the ground of privileged communication except in the case of
communications between an attorney and client."20 0 Thus, Texas
has opted for full abrogation of the clergy-communicant privilege
and only partial abrogation of the attorney-client privilege.
Though all of the foregoing reporting laws vary in language, struc-
ture and degree of differential treatment, none seem to satisfy
even the baseline requirement of facial neutrality as defined in
Smith and Lukumi.
It is beyond all doubt that reporting laws exist for the purpose
of detecting and eradicating child abuse. Nevertheless, several
statutes contain prefatory clauses in which governmental inter-
ests, moral truisms and policy aims are specifically cataloged. For
example, Kentucky's statute proclaims:
Children have certain fundamental rights which must be
protected and preserved, including but not limited to, the
rights to adequate food, clothing and shelter; the right to
195. Id. § 26-14-3(f).
196. § 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2004) (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. TEx. FAM. CODE § 261.101(c) (Vernon 2004).
200. Id. § 261.202.
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be free from physical, sexual or emotional injury or
exploitation; the right to develop physically, mentally,
and emotionally to their potential; and the right to educa-
tional instruction and the right to a secure, stable
family.201
The protection of children from physical harm or death is in-
dubitably an interest of the highest order in our society. Basic
rights of self-preservation, personal security and individual
autonomy comprise the core justification for the very existence of
a social contract.20 2 But the admittedly "compelling" nature of the
governmental interest in preventing child abuse is really inappo-
site here. Rather, the determinative inquiry is whether lawmakers
have decided that legal counselors are so prized as to overcome the
imperative of protecting children whereas similarly situated spiri-
tual counselors are not. The constitutionality of mandatory report-
201. K.Y. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.010 (Michie 2002).
202. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. PREAMBLE:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
Id. (emphasis added); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, reprinted in
MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: READINGS FROM MACHIAVELLI TO NIETZSCHE 189
(David Wootton ed., 1996):
A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of
men do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that
whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the ma-
jor part, the right to present the person of them all, (that is to
say, to be their representative) every one, as well he that voted
for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions
and judgments, of that man, or assembly of men, in the same
manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably
amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.
Id.; JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, reprinted in, MODERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT: READINGS FROM MACHIAVELLI TO NIETZSCHE 341 (David
Wootton ed., 1996):
The only way, whereby any one divests himself of his natural
liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing
with other men to join and unite into a community, for their
comfortable, safe, peaceable living one amongst another, in a
secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security
against any, that are not of it.
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ing laws should turn on whether they are "narrowly tailored" to
advance their laudable goals. In order to sharpen this analysis, it
is important first to briefly compare the attorney-client and
clergy-communicant privileges.
D. The Clergy-Communicant Privilege
All fifty states have secured some form of clergy-communicant
privilege through statutory law.203 These privilege statutes are
driven primarily by a respect for free exercise and church auton-
omy principles. 20 4 Although only the Roman Catholic, Lutheran,
Latter-day Saints and Eastern Orthodox churches recognize the
formal sacrament of confession,205 many statutes protect not only
"penitential" communications but also "counseling" or "spiritual
advice" communications, which include any confidential communi-
cation made by the communicant to a clergy member in his capac-
ity as a spiritual advisor. 206 Moreover, the majority of statutes
provide that the privilege survives the death of the communi-
cant. 20 7
It is noteworthy that the religious profundity of maintaining a
scrupulous code of confidentiality is considerably greater for the
Catholic priest than for the Presbyterian minister. If the minister
reveals a communication imparted to him in confidence, he may
invite the ire of his congregation and forfeit his ministerial posi-
tion within a particular community of faith. 208 The Catholic
Church, on the other hand, has unwaveringly treated the confes-
sional relationship as sacrosanct. 20 9 Indeed, the Sacrament of Rec-
onciliation is one of the seven sacramental pillars of the Catholic
203. Supra Part IV.
204. Bailey, supra note 191, at 519-20.
205. See id. at 502; R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is it (Past)
Time for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1627, 1641 (2003).
206. J. Michael Keel, Comment, Law and Religion Collide Again: The
Priest-Penitent Privilege in Child Abuse Reporting Cases, 28 CUMB. L. REV.
681, 689 (1998) ("[M]any of the statutes broaden the scope of the privileged
communications between the priest and the penitent by extending the privi-
lege to communications made to a minister during a counseling session.").
207. See Cassidy, supra note 205, at 1639.
208. See Shannon O'Malley, Note, At All Costs: Mandatory Child Abuse
Reporting Statutes and the Clergy-Communicant Privilege, 21 REV. LITIG.
701, 711 (2002).
209. See id. at 712.
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Church; it "relieves the burden of individual sinfulness and draws
one closer to the life and mission of the Church- the mystical
body of Christ."210 As admonished by ancient Canon Law:
Let the priest be absolutely aware that he does not by
word or sign or by any manner whatsoever in any way be-
tray the sinner.... For whoever shall dare to reveal a sin
disclosed to him in the tribunal of penance we decree that
he shall be not only deposed from the priestly office, but
that he shall also be sent into the confinement of a mon-
astery to do perpetual penance. 211
Mandatory reporting laws that abrogate spiritual codes of
confidentiality clearly implicate free exercise rights. Presently, the
Code of Canon Law of the Catholic Church states: "The sacramen-
tal seal is inviolable; accordingly, it is absolutely wrong for a con-
fessor in any way to betray a penitent, for any reason whatsoever,
whether by word or in any other fashion."212 According to this
spiritual law, "the priest has no mortal remembrance of what has
been confessed, but rather possesses knowledge meant solely for
God's ears."213 Violation of the seal is a "crime" against the Church
and a sin against God, and the penalty prescribed in most cases is
automatic excommunication - a permanent alienation from the
Church and from God Himself.214 Because reporting laws essen-
tially render certain spiritual and civil obligations mutually an-
tagonistic, they constitute a discernible burden on church
autonomy and religious exercise. 215
The evidentiary privilege has roots in utilitarian legal thought
that justifies nondisclosure on the grounds that confidential com-
munication between clergy and communicant is crucial to the
210. See Anthony Merlino, Comment, Tightening the Seal: Protecting the
Catholic Confessional from Unprotective Priest-Penitent Privileges, 32 SETON
HALL L. REV. 655, 695 (2002).
211. R.S. Nolan, The Law of the Seal of Confession, in 13 THE CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 649 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., 1912).
212. 1983 CODEX IURIS CANONICI c.983, 1, 2.
213. See Merlino, supra note 210, at 746-47.
214. Id. at 703-04.
215. See Keel, supra note 206, at 702-703 ("[T]he clergyman... could ad-
here to his religious beliefs and accept the criminal penalties levied against
him, or he could obey the law by turning his back upon his religious convic-
tions. This choice essentially pressures the clergyman to forego his religion to
comply with government mandates.").
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maintenance of an important and socially desirable relationship.
With respect to the fiduciary relationship between clergy and
communicant, "the injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communications [is] greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."216 The cost-
benefit balance is struck in favor of preserving the privilege "be-
cause the cost of a privilege (measured in undiscoverable evidence)
would not properly include information that would not exist but
for that privilege."217 Because it is widely believed that the confi-
dentiality guarantee facilitates the communicant's admissions, the
cost side of the equation must include only volunteered informa-
tion, or information that would likely have been relayed to clergy
in the absence of the privilege. 218 Outside the reporting context,
countervailing societal (and constitutional) considerations have
outweighed interests in the availability of evidence and the "truth"
seeking function of the accusatorial system.
The privilege is also invaluable to the communicant. Roman
Catholics must make a full confession at least once annually.219
Christian eschatology holds that failure to obtain absolution or do
penance for one's sins before death is met with the prospect of
eternal damnation.220 Thus, the Sacrament of Penance is valued
both for its inherent sanctity and for its edifying effect on the
penitent. Cardinal Bevilacqua has explained that, "[w]ere the Sac-
rament rendered difficult or odious to the faithful they would be
deterred from approaching it, thereby undermining the Sacrament
itself to the great spiritual harm of the faithful, as well as to the
entire Church."221 Even in denominations that do not recognize
sacramental confessions, the maintenance of a private clergy-
penitent relationship is integral to one's eternal salvation. C.S.
216. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285
(John T. McNaughton ed. 1961).
217. Bailey, supra note 191, at 505.
218. Id.
219. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 1457 (Doubleday, 1995).
220. E.g., Matthew, 3:11-12 ("I baptize you with water for repentance, but
the one who is more powerful than I is coming after me.... His winnowing
fork is in his hand, and he will gather his wheat into the granary. But the
chaff he will burn with an unquenchable fire.").
221. Cardinal Anthony Bevilacqua, Confidentiality Obligation of Clergy
from the Perspective of Roman Catholic Priests, 29 LoY. L. A. L. REV. 1733,
1736 (1996).
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Lewis, the great scholar, writer, and Christian apologist, defined
the "clergy" as "those particular people within the whole Church
who have been specially trained and set aside to look after what
concerns us as creatures who are going to live forever." 222 If one
accepts Lewis' foundational premise that we are eternal creatures,
it is difficult to imagine any relationship in the temporal world
that would be of greater importance than that between a spiritual
counselor and his communicant.
E. The Attorney-Client Privilege
Unlike the statutorily protected clergy-communicant privi-
lege, the attorney-client privilege has common-law origins. 223 Oth-
erwise, the two privileges are very similar. Like the clergy-
communicant privilege, confidentiality is "essential" to the main-
tenance of the attorney-client relationship. 224 It is difficult to
imagine that a client would reveal criminal wrongdoings in the
absence of the privilege, so "the loss of evidence is more apparent
than real."225 Moreover, abrogation of the privilege would have a
chilling effect on communication because attorneys would inform
their clients of an abuse-exception, thereby undermining the goal
of full and candid disclosure. 226
The efficacious operation of the American legal system is said
to depend on "sound legal advice or advocacy" which, in turn, "de-
pends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client."227 Like
many clergy-communicant privilege statutes, the Federal Rules of
Evidence assure the posthumous application of the attorney-client
privilege because "full and frank communication.., promote [s]
broader public interests in the observance of law and the admini-
stration of justice."228  Furthermore, just as the clergy-
222. C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHIUSTIANITY 75 (1952) (Fontana Books, 1960).
223. See Bailey, supra note 191, at 509.
224. WIGMORE, supra note 216, at § 2285.
225. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 408 (1998) ("[T]he
loss of evidence admittedly caused by the privilege is justified in part by the
fact that without the privilege, the client may not have made such communi-
cations in the first place.").
226. See Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-
Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42
DuKE L.J. 203, 230-32 (1992).
227. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
228. Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 403 (citation omitted).
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communicant privilege is buttressed by concerns for church
autonomy, rights-based justifications of the attorney-client privi-
lege strongly discourage interference with client autonomy and
control over private information. 229 Perhaps most importantly, the
privilege is afforded a measure of constitutional protection as a
prerequisite to the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel.230  Thus, like the clergy-
communicant privilege, the attorney-client privilege implicates in-
terests of a constitutional caliber.
However, there is one significant distinction between these
two evidentiary privileges: the attorney-client privilege contains a
"crime-fraud exception" where "the client's purpose is the further-
ance of a future intended crime or fraud."231 In order to fall within
the exception, however, the client must attempt to use the attor-
ney's expertise for some prospective criminal or fraudulent act.232
The clergy-communicant privilege, on the other hand, does not
contain such an exception as it is generally held to be absolute in
coverage. 233 Privilege statutes would presumably respect the un-
compromising tenor of canon law in even the most compelling exi-
gencies.
F. A Modest Proposal for Protecting Religion
Smith and Lukumi may be regarded as poles on each end of
the largely uncharted spectrum of general applicability. On one
end, Smith suggests that the mere existence of a single nonreli-
gious exception does not implicate the nondiscrimination princi-
ple. 234 On the other end, Lukumi intimates that the existence of
229. See Mosteller, supra note 226, at 266.
230. See id. at 270-71.
231. CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 95 (John
W. Strong et. al. eds., 4th ed. 1992).
232. See Mosteller, supra note 226, at 246.
233. See Merlino, supra note 210, at 748 ("In short, the Catholic Church
defends sacramental confession with absolutism that is foreign to and in di-
rect conflict with state laws that are quite stingy in privileging certain com-
munications in order to further the truth-seeking function of legal
tribunals.").
234. The Oregon controlled substance statute provided an exemption for
substances "prescribed by a medical practitioner." Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990). Nonetheless, the Court refused to provide an ex-
emption for the religious use of peyote. Id. at 888-90.
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myriad nonreligious exceptions does implicate the nondiscrimina-
tion principle.235 If the creation of the neutrality and general ap-
plicability requirements inaugurated no more than a
jurisprudence of exemption head-counting, then the task of identi-
fying the point at which a law becomes sufficiently discriminatory
would be susceptible of arbitrary line-drawing. As Newark illus-
trates, there is good reason to conclude that the doctrinal analyses
of Smith and Lukumi do not turn on the quantity of exceptions
alone, provided that a law is not entirely exceptionless. Rather,
the Third Circuit's decision in Newark characterizes these seminal
decisions as encapsulating the more substantive inquiry of
whether there is a (1) nonreligious (or secular) exception that (2)
damages the governmental interest in the challenged law in a way
that is (3) similar to or greater than some analogous religious ac-
tivity that is prohibited. 236
The facially discriminatory character of the foregoing report-
ing laws obviates a survey of circumstantial evidence, even though
their legislative histories may very well reveal visceral policy
judgments lurking behind the statutory language. Violation of the
general applicability requirement flows automatically from a vio-
lation of facial neutrality. The classic gerrymander could con-
ceivably fail the former test and satisfy the latter, but no law that
is non-neutral on its face can possibly function neutrally in prac-
tice.237 Reporting laws that abrogate the clergy-communicant
privilege and preserve the attorney-client privilege are problem-
atic under a broad formulation of Lukumi because they prohibit
certain religious conduct but do not pursue the objective of pro-
tecting children with respect to virtually identical nonreligious
conduct.
The proposition that attorneys may conceal crucial informa-
tion with impunity establishes an exception inimical to the gov-
ernmental interest in protecting children. Moreover, the only
relevant difference between the attorney-client and clergy-
communicant privileges as they relate to the governmental inter-
est is that the former does not protect communications of intent to
235. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 536-37 (1993).
236. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365-66
(3rd Cir. 1999).
237. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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commit a future criminal act, whereas the latter admits of no such
exception. 238 However, the client must actually intend to enlist
lawyerly acumen in the pursuit of such an act for the communica-
tion to lose its privileged status.239 Though perhaps foreseeable,
the scenario of a client using legal advice as a tool for inflicting a
future act of violence upon a child seems highly improbable. And
even if such attempts occurred with alarming frequency, the gov-
ernmental interests could be achieved by a narrower means that
burden clergy members to a far lesser degree. For example, an ex-
plicit statutory retention of a qualified clergy-communicant privi-
lege - one that contains a similar "dangerous person" exception -
would satisfy the "narrow tailoring" prong of strict scrutiny
analysis. 240
In light of the governmental objectives to ensure the "health
and welfare" of children and to "make the home safe for children
by enhancing the parental capacity for good child care,"241 the only
other relevant difference between spiritual and legal counselors in
this context actually supports the retention of the clergy-
communicant privilege:
While the attorney will address the client's legal con-
cerns, the member of the clergy will address the moral or
spiritual well-being of the penitent. Although the attor-
ney will facilitate an efficient and fair disposition of any
legal problems, she is not likely to concern herself with
the underlying causes of the behavior that made legal
representation necessary in the first place. In contrast,
the cleric specifically addresses the underlying causes to
238. See Michael J. Mazza, Note, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent
Privilege, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 171, 186 (1998) ("The priest-penitent privilege has
generally been considered absolute, prohibiting any revelation of the pro-
tected communication, unlike the other evidentiary privileges with their nu-
merous exceptions.").
239. MCCORMICK, supra note 231, at § 95 ("[Ilt is settled under modern au-
thority that the privilege does not extend to communications between attor-
ney and client where the client's purpose is the furtherance of a future
intended crime or fraud.").
240. See generally Cassidy, supra note 205, at 1696-97 (arguing that
members of the clergy should be required to disclose information of a peni-
tent's intention to commit a future crime involving serious bodily injury or
death).
241. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (2003).
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help the penitent overcome them. 242
The penitent is encouraged to mitigate the harm caused by
his transgressions, which may include the return of stolen items,
compensation (monetary or otherwise) for injuries, or an admis-
sion of culpability to the proper authorities. In sum, the confes-
sional relationship "promotes the reparation and atonement the
legal system seeks to achieve on behalf of society."243 In compari-
son, attorneys work zealously and indefatigably to rid their clients
of legal encumbrances, whereas clergy members strive to inculcate
moral virtue and transform the penitent into a spiritually rejuve-
nated and law-abiding citizen. Rather than impede the disclosure,
detection and punishment of child abuse, a robust clergy-
communicant privilege may actually effectuate these ends.
Discriminatory reporting laws are not teeming with perni-
cious desires to persecute members of the clergy. The underinclu-
sion of these statutes is not as substantial as in Lukumi because
the burden falls not only on religious, but countless other secular
entities as well. These laws are more likely the result of a semi-
conscious devaluation of religion - a subtle yet persistent procliv-
ity that must be exposed and uprooted.244 Justice Kennedy has as-
tutely observed:
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, rises not
from malice or hostile animus alone. It may result as well
from insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, ra-
tional reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to
guard against people who appear to be different in some
respects from ourselves. 245
The disparities in treatment may be partly explained by the
fact that many legislators are attorneys who naturally (albeit
wrongly) tend to value the attorney-client privilege more than the
clergy-communicant privilege. Legislators may simply fold under
constituent pressure to suspend evidentiary privileges and decide,
amid cacophonous criticism, to strike the political bargain in favor
242. Bailey, supra note 191, at 511.
243. See Merlino, supra note 210, at 743 (emphasis added).
244. See Beerworth, supra note 19, at 383.
245. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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of their own profession. 246 At a time when public sentiment toward
clerical personnel is less than favorable, lawmakers stand to win
popularity points by simply tossing out the clergy-communicant
privilege altogether rather than retaining or qualifying it.
The Third Circuit in Newark applied the non-discrimination
principle of Lukumi beyond the extreme instance in which law-
makers decide to inflict particularized harm on a discrete and in-
sular religious minority.247 If the cornerstone of refurbished free
exercise doctrine is underinclusion, then some reporting laws do
not pass constitutional muster. In fact, the very presence of the at-
torney-client privilege exception renders the law unconstitutional
per se, because an exception that is patently inconsistent with the
legislative purpose compels a finding that the law could be more
narrowly tailored to further that purpose. 248 There is more than
one way to comply with Smith and Lukumi in the reporting con-
text. A state could either remove the secular exception entirely
(making the statute generally applicable), or allow an equivalent
exception for religiously motivated conduct (removing the free ex-
ercise burden altogether). Even a reporting law that exempts only
the clergy-communicant privilege would not likely present Estab-
lishment Clause problems, 249 particularly if the privilege would
enable religious organizations to define and carry out their own
doctrine free from governmental interference. 250
The overall tenor of the Lukumi opinion gives proponents of a
more expansive Free Exercise Clause reason to hold out some
hope. 25 1 On the other hand, Lukumi could be confined to those
246. See Bailey, supra note 191, at 522-23.
247. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360
(3rd Cir. 1999).
248. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546 (finding that the fact that the "proffered
objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious con-
duct.., suffices to establish the invalidity of the ordinances.").
249. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (rejecting an Establish-
ment Clause challenge to a Title VII exemption for religious organizations
and stating that "[w]here.. . government acts with the proper purpose of lift-
ing a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, we see no reason to re-
quire that the exemption come packaged with benefits to secular entities.").
250. See id. at 339.
251. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547 ("The Free Exercise Clause commits gov-
ernment itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that pro-
posals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its
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rare instances in which lawmakers engage in extreme under-
valuation or persecution of religion. 2 2 Even assuming, arguendo,
that strict scrutiny applies not only to underinclusive individual-
ized exemption systems but also to "categories of selection," seri-
ous concerns abound.2 3 It is uncertain how the Court would
wrestle with legislation like mandatory reporting statutes that
contain far fewer and more principled secular exceptions. 25 4 De-
spite the disparate treatment in such laws, they contain only one
exception that is amply supported in common law, constitutional
law, and public policy.
If the Court rejects the Tenafly reasoning and reaffirms either
a "substantial burden" or "compulsory" practice requirement (or
both), many non-Catholic clergy members may not successfully
assert free exercise challenges despite serious problems of under-
inclusion. Recall that most clergy-communicant privilege statutes
protect "spiritual advice" communications so as to extend the con-
fidentiality guarantee to all religions.255 The Catholic priest must
practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the
Constitution and to the rights it secures.").
252. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. __; 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314-15 (2004) (dis-
tinguishing the suppression of Santeria worship in Lukumi from the decision
of state officials to deny funding under a state scholarship program to a stu-
dent seeking a degree in "devotional theology"); see also Davey v. Locke, 299
F.3d 748, 762 (9th Cir. 2002). The dissent in that opinion stated:
[In Lukumi], the challenged ordinances were the rare but
quintessential example of laws that directly prohibit certain
religious practices... Nothing could have more clearly
prohibited the church members' religious exercise than
these criminal sanctions: their choice was to practice their
religion upon threat of persecution. In contrast, Davey's
decision to pursue a degree in theology carries no such
ominous retribution... I do not find any guidance in
Lukumi beyond the criminal ordinances at issue there as to
what might constitute an impermissibly burdensome law
prohibiting religious exercise.
Id. (McKeown, J., dissenting).
253. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 542.
254. See Kenneth D. Sansom, Note, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the
Space Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in Current Free Exercise
Jurisprudence, 77 TEX. L. REV. 753, 768 (1999).
255. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. In contrast, Delaware has
preserved the clergy-communicant privilege only insofar as the communica-
tion takes place in a "sacramental confession." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 909
(2003). Although such a provision raises non-establishment concerns because
of its limited applicability, this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
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assiduously conceal confessional communications as a matter of
religious obligation. On the other hand, to compel disclosure of in-
formation gathered in a spiritual advice setting is not to force
clergy to transgress a tenet of their faith. That is, there is no relig-
iously imposed oath to secrecy in the non-sacramental setting, or
at least it could be described as less than compulsory. 256 For these
reasons, the burden placed on a large class of clergy may not be
deemed "substantial." Unless Tenafly is followed in this regard, a
constitutional challenge to reporting laws will be difficult to
mount successfully for those religions that do not recognize the
formal sacrament of confession.
V. LOCKE V. DAVEY: ANOMALY OR PRESAGE?
This term, the Court altered the Smith/Lukumi calculus,
though "the decision may be properly regarded as an unusually
narrow one."257 Locke v. Davey258 involved a Washington state
scholarship program for academically gifted students who at-
tended either a public or private (including religiously affiliated)
postsecondary institution, provided the institution was duly ac-
credited. 259 In accordance with a provision in the state constitution
prohibiting public funding for "any religious worship, exercise or
instruction... ,"260 the scholarship program explicitly excluded
any student who sought a "degree in theology." 261 As a matter of
federal constitutional law, it is nearly axiomatic that public finan-
cial aid to a student seeking a degree in theology does not violate
the Establishment Clause.262 Locke, therefore, posed the question
of whether a state, pursuant to its own non-establishment provi-
sion, could essentially overprotect its taxpayers' "freedom of con-
science" without running afoul of the federal Free Exercise
Clause.263
256. See Abrams, supra note 176, at 1144.
257. Beerworth, supra note 19, at 383.
258. 540 U.S. ___ 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
259. Id. at 1309-10.
260. Id. at 1312 n.2 (quoting WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11).
261. Id. at 1310.
262. See Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U.S. 481,
489 (1986) (upholding against an Establishment Clause challenge a state tui-
tion grant for a blind student who planned to use the funds at a Christian col-
lege in preparation for the ministry).
263. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312 & n.2.
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The Ninth Circuit had invalidated the scholarship program
under Lukumi, holding that religion had been facially targeted for
unfavorable treatment and that "the State's own antiestablish-
ment concerns were not compelling."26 4 Writing the opinion for the
majority in Locke, Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed and declared:
"there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment
Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause."265
Rehnquist then plunged into state constitutional history and un-
covered evidence supporting the prerogative of the state to pre-
vent the procurement of tax funds to support ministerial
endeavors. 266 As such, the State's antiestablishment interests
were deemed "historic and substantial."267 The Court's emerging
jurisprudential philosophy of permissible accommodation had evi-
dently created the requisite "play in the joints"268 between the Re-
ligion Clauses in which the states could protect nonestablishment
interests not guaranteed by the federal Establishment Clause.
However, one might argue that going above the minimum federal
floor as to the Establishment Clause means going well below the
minimum federal floor as to the Free Exercise Clause.
Accordingly, then, Locke cabined Lukumi in some potentially
cataclysmic respects. First, the Court refused to attach a pre-
sumption of invalidity to the scholarship program even though the
program violated the facial neutrality requirement by isolating
the study of theology for disfavored treatment. The Court rea-
soned that application of strict scrutiny was inappropriate because
nothing in the "history or text" of the State Constitution or the
scholarship program "suggests animus towards religion."269
Rather, the disparate treatment at issue in Locke was "of a far
milder kind" than that at issue in Lukumi. 270 The Court justified
the religion-specific classification on what seemed like rational ba-
sis grounds, stating that "training for religious professions and
training for secular professions are not fungible."271 Of course,
Santeria animal sacrifice and secular modes of butchery are not
264. Id. at 1311.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 1313-14.
267. Id. at 1315.
268. Id. at 1311.
269. Id. at 1315.
270. Id. at 1312.
271. Id. at 1313.
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fungible either. They are just very similar. Like the study of his-
tory and the study of religion, the minute differences between
these forms of slaughter cannot justify gaping disparities in
treatment.
Beyond animus, the Court intimated that heightened scrutiny
applies to a law that is not neutral or generally applicable and ei-
ther: (1) imposes criminal or civil penalties on a religious practice,
(2) excludes ministers from participation in the political commu-
nity, or (3) puts students to a choice between their religious con-
victions and the receipt of a government benefit. 272 Apparently, a
desire to obtain a degree in theology did not constitute a religious
conviction. The Court also noted the "relatively minor burden"
placed on scholars seeking degrees in theology as an additional
reason to avoid the stringent Lukumi test. 273 Fortunately, manda-
tory reporting laws remain constitutionally problematic even un-
der Locke inasmuch as they are both facially nonneutral and
impose criminal and civil penalties on a religious sacrament.
In a strange twist, Justice Scalia's dissent in Locke adhered
most faithfully to Lukumi and railed against any further narrow-
ing of the Free Exercise Clause. Applying the baseline require-
ment of facial neutrality, Scalia asserted that "[n]o field of study
but religion is singled out for disfavor" in this "generally available
public benefit."274 Far from demanding a "special benefit to which
others are not entitled,"275 scholars who sought devotional degrees
sought "only equal treatment"276 in the disbursement of a public
benefit. In contrast with the majority, Scalia asserted that the
State had a compelling interest only in avoiding actual Estab-
lishment Clause violations. 277 Since the prospect of such a viola-
tion was nonexistent in these circumstances, the differential
treatment of religious and secular academic degrees was imper-
missible under Lukumi. Scalia chastised the majority for essen-
tially limiting the protections of the Free Exercise Clause to cases
involving animus toward religion:
The Court does not explain why the legislature's motive
272. See id. at 1312-13.
273. Id. at 1315.
274. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 1318 n.2.
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matters, and I fail to see why it should ... It is sufficient
that the citizen's rights have been infringed ... We do
sometimes look to legislative intent to smoke out more
subtle instances of discrimination, but we do so as a sup-
plement to the core guarantee of facially equal treatment,
not as a replacement for it.278
Scalia also scolded the Court for weighing the religious bur-
den under laws that fail Smith's minimum facial neutrality re-
quirement: "[Bleing singled out for special burdens on the basis of
religious calling is so profound that the concrete harm produced
can never be dismissed as insubstantial. The Court has not re-
quired proof of 'substantial' concrete harm with other forms of [fa-
cial] discrimination, and it should not do so here."279 In sum, the
Court in Locke suspended the facial neutrality requirement of
Smith, confined Lukumi to animus toward religion and imposed a
"substantial burden" requirement even for challenges to facially
discriminatory laws (in opposition to Tenafly).
Read broadly, Locke not only confines Lukumi to its facts, but
also emasculates the very precedent that supports the nonperse-
cution principle, at least insofar as facial discrimination triggers
heightened scrutiny.280 On the other hand, Locke can be under-
stood as merely the latest pronouncement that the Bill of Rights
protects only negative, rather than positive, liberties. The Court
has recognized that the Free Exercise and Due Process Clauses
carve out freedoms from government interference, not entitle-
ments to government assistance. 281 The Court in Locke alluded to
278. Id. at 1319.
279. Id. at 1318-19 (citations omitted).
280. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (invalidating a state
constitutional provision facially disqualifying clergy from sitting in the legis-
lature).
281. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (holding that the Due Process Clause contains no affirmative right
to governmental assistance, even where such assistance would have pre-
vented the physical abuse of a child); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) ("the Free Exercise Clause is writ-
ten in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms
of what the individual can exact from the government."); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (upholding, against a due process and equal pro-
tection challenge, the denial of federal funding for abortions on the grounds
that "[tihe financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ability to
enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the
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this distinction between negative and positive liberties in its justi-
fication of the exclusionary scholarship program: "The State has
merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction."28 2
Scalia emphasizes the free exercise dimension of exclusionary
educational aid programs and asserts that, "if the Religion
Clauses demand neutrality, we must enforce them, in hard cases
as well as easy ones."28 3 The facial neutrality shibboleth that
guided the Court in Smith and Lukumi was suddenly and casually
cast aside in Locke. Perhaps it was the price paid for judicial so-
licitude of local "antiestablishment interests" not recognized by
the federal Constitution.24 At bottom, Scalia and the Locke major-
ity sharply diverge on the fundamental doctrinal question of
whether the inclusion of religion in educational aid programs is
merely permissible under the Establishment Clause or mandatory
under the Free Exercise Clause. The crux of Locke is that the in-
vocation of antiestablishment liberties not protected under the Es-
tablishment Clause trumps liberty interests (namely, the interest
in not being singled out for disfavored treatment) otherwise pro-
tected under the Free Exercise Clause. Even if Locke is readily
distinguishable as an "educational aid" or "positive rights" excep-
tion to free exercise methodology, its weak characterization of Lu-
kumi portends a further diminution of religious liberty.8 5
CONCLUSION
In the post-Smith era, the Free Exercise Clause has been
hailed a "leaner, meaner religious-liberty-protecting machine." 28 6
Its leanness is readily observable, but its ferocity has yet to be
tested by the right fact pattern. If, in fact, newly refurbished Free
Exercise doctrine has any teeth, States that exempt attorneys
from mandatory reporting requirements must either provide a
correspondingly protective exemption to clergy or extend the legal
duty to attorneys as well as to clergy in an effort to comport with
the apparent mandate of Smith. If the Free Exercise Clause is to
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of
her indigency.").
282. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1313 (emphasis added).
283. Id. at 1317 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 1313.
285. See Beerworth, supra note 19, at 384.
286. Duncan, supra note 121, at 883.
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be of any practical use to the religious citizen, the narrow tailoring
analysis must develop a keen sensitivity to the subtlest devalua-
tion of religion in regulatory schemes.
Clerical personnel comprise the engine of many mainstream
institutional faiths that boast scores of followers. It would be re-
miss, however, to assume a priori that clergy have the ability to
marshal veritable armies of parishioners to their side whenever
the political tide turns unfavorably against them. Recall that
Rhode Island has enacted a reporting statute that preserves the
attorney-client privilege, yet presumably abolishes the clergy-
communicant privilege in full. If the religious liberties of clergy
are insecure in one of the most Catholic states in the nation- a
state steeped in the life and thought of Roger Williams, 287 with a
rich historical legacy of spearheading the national commitment to
religious pluralism288 - how secure can these liberties be else-
287. Having been banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635
for expressing vehement opposition to a law compelling church attendance
and monetary contribution, Roger Williams fled into a wilderness now known
as Providence. Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams' Gift: Religious Freedom in
America, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 425, 433 (1999). Williams influenced
the governmental structure and principles of the Providence colony and
helped to shape the first legislation in the Western world that safeguarded
the "liberty of conscience" for all believers. PATRICK T. CONLEY, RHODE ISLAND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1636-1775: A SURVEY 7, reprinted from
RHODE ISLAND HISTORY XXVII (April and June, 1968). Under Williams' influ-
ence, "the complete freedom of mind and conscience from all civil bonds" be-
came the "actual reason and purpose of the state's existence." SANFORD H.
COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 423 (Burt
Franklin 1970) (1902).
288. Throughout the eighteenth century, Rhode Island was known
throughout the New England colonies for its "unsavory reputation for reli-
gious radicalism and libertinism." THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 90-
91 (1986).Unlike most New England colonies, Rhode Island had no estab-
lished church. Id. As such, Rhode Island law required that "all ministers be
supported by voluntary contributions." Id. During the infancy of the Republic,
Rhode Island was counted among the few states in which the utmost level of
constitutional protection for religious conduct was extended to all persons; it
became one of only three states to grant exemptions from military conscrip-
tions to Quakers, Mennonites and other groups who voiced religious objec-
tions to the bearing of arms. See McConnell, supra note 101, at 1468.
Additionally, Rhode Island enacted an act in the 1790s, entitled
"Relative to Religious Freedom and the Maintenance of Ministers", declaring:
[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any reli-
gious worship, place or ministry whatsoever; nor shall be en-
forced, restrained, molested, or bothered in his body or goods,
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where? It seems as though reporting laws such as this demon-
strate that clergy are no less a religious minority than Santeria
worshippers. As Scalia so poignantly remarked in his Locke dis-
sent:
Most citizens of this country identify themselves as pro-
fessing some religious belief, but ... those whose belief in
their religion is so strong that they dedicate their study
and their lives to its ministry are a far narrower set. One
need not delve too far into modern popular culture to per-
ceive a trendy disdain for deep religious conviction.289
It is perhaps tempting to take solace in Professor Douglas
Laycock's remark that "[] ust as it is better to light a candle than
to curse the darkness, so it is better to develop the exceptions than
to curse the adverse holdings."290 Application of this treasured ad-
age to free exercise doctrine suggests that a hard-nosed pragmatic
strategy of limiting Smith's potential breadth is preferable to as-
sailing its core premises outright. The prominence of this view in
academic and juristic circles may be partly explained by the fact
that, in the fourteen years since Smith was decided, no solid coali-
tion on the Court has formed to overrule it.291 But even if we avert
our eyes from the glaring frailties of Smith, there are no ironclad
assurances that future doctrinal development will expand, rather
than severely limit, the narrow exception to the Smith rule as rec-
ognized in Lukumi.
However narrow or anomalous Locke may seem, it is a useful
tool for those who favor greater restraints on religious liberty.
Faced with such ominous uncertainty, perhaps we would do better
nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinion
or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by ar-
gument to maintain, their opinions in matters of religion, and
that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge or affect their
civil capacities.
PATRICK T. CONLEY, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: RHODE ISLAND'S CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 1776-1841, 173 (1977). One historian has described this stat-
ute as a "vigorous reaffirmation of Rhode Island's long-standing commitment
to the principles of religious liberty and church-state separation." Id.
289. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
290. Laycock, supra note 134, at 57.
291. Presently, only Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer have expressed
a willingness to seriously reconsider or overrule Smith. City of Boerne v. Flo-
res, 521 U.S. 507, 544-45, 565-66 (1997).
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to heed the poet's plea and "not go gentle into that good night" but
rather "rage, rage against the dying of the light."292 Such staunch
opposition to Smith may prove more efficacious in restoring the
Free Exercise Clause to its rightful function as a palladium -
rather than a crumbling colonnade - of religious liberty in our
constitutional democracy. Despite disagreements over strategy,
most agree that Smith painted a jurisprudential picture that de-
picts a setting sun for a freedom vital to many. A duly brought
free exercise challenge to discriminatory reporting laws would
elicit a more definite answer to the critical question of just how
dark the canvass will become.
292. DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night, in THE
COLLECTED POEMS OF DYLAN THOMAS 128 (New Directions 1971) (1939).
